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Home Dr. George S. Stanford

Why Forge Ahead With IFRs?

There are good reasons to forge ahead with IFRs.  Here are some:

1.  Eighty years of waste from 1000 (1-GWe) reactors would leave enough used fuel for 10 or 20 Yucca Mountains.

2. The environmental effects of accelerated uranium mining will impinge increasingly on the public's consciousness.  Resistance to uranium mining is already growing.

3.  The accumulating plutonium inventory will, rightly or wrongly, be seen as an ever-increasing proliferation risk,

4.  The multiplying need for uranium enrichment means the spread of centrifuge technology and loss of international control of that technology, with serious proliferation implications.

5.  Since China, India, Russia, et al. are forging ahead with their fast-reactor programs, technological leadership will continue to move in that direction.

6.  The concomitant spread of fuel-processing technology will mean loss of international control of that technology, with further serious proliferation implications.

7.  No nation can make nuclear weapons without either enrichment or reprocessing facilities, regardless of how many reactors it has.  The loss of U.S. technological leadership will mean the loss of ability to bring order to the global development and deployment of nuclear technology, with the consequent uninhibited spread of proliferation potential.

8.  The institutional knowledge of the U.S.-developed IFR technology is rapidly dying off, accelerating the North American descent to second-class technological status.

 

Reprocessing is the Answer

George S. Stanford, Gerald E. Marsh, and William Hannum

BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 31 August 2009


Article Highlights

  • Advancements in nuclear power should help the world move beyond fossil fuels.
  • In particular, spent fuel recycling with fast reactors would solve some of the most vexing problems facing conventional nuclear power.
  • Other benefits include reducing weapons proliferation risks and excess plutonium and uranium stockpiles.

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Bombs, Reprocessing, and Reactor Grade Plutonium

Gerald E. Marsh and George S. Stanford

FORUM ON PHYSICS & SOCIETY of The American Physical Society Newsletter
April 2006, Vol. 35, No. 2


A recent, ill-conceived call to action from the Union of Concerned Scientists says this:

“In his State of the Union address, President Bush called for investment in ‘clean, safe nuclear energy.’ This seemingly harmless phrase, however,

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Smarter Use of Nuclear Waste

Fast-neutron reactors could extract much more energy from recycled nuclear fuel, minimize the risks of weapons proliferation and markedly reduce the time nuclear waste must be isolated.
By William H. Hannum, Gerald E. Marsh and George S. Stanford

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Integral Fast Reactors: Source of Safe, Abundant, Non-Polluting Power

From an interview with George Stanford in National Policy Analysis, Dec. 2001

What is the IFR?

You mean, "What was the IFR?"

O.K., what was the IFR?

IFR stands for Integral Fast Reactor. It was a power-reactor-development program, built around a revolutionary concept for generating nuclear power - not only a new type of reactor, but an entire new nuclear fuel cycle. The reactor part of that fuel cycle was called the ALMR - Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor. In what many see as an ill-conceived move, proof-of-concept research on the IFR/ALMR was discontinued by the U.S. government in 1994, only three years before completion.

You might soon see references to the AFR, which stands for "Advanced Fast Reactor." It's a concept very similar to the IFR, with some improvements thrown in.

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George S. Stanford

George Stanford, Ph.D., is a nuclear reactor physicist, part of the team that developed the Integral Fast Reactor. He is now retired from Argonne National Laboratory after a career of experimental work pertaining to power-reactor safety. He is the co-author of Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry.